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Does Biology Drive Child Penalties? Evidence from Biological
and Adoptive Families
By Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais and Jakob Egholt Søgaard*
This paper investigates if the impact of children on the labor mar-
ket outcomes of women relative to men — child penalties — can
be explained by the biological links between mother and child. We
estimate child penalties in biological and adoptive families using
event studies around the arrival of children and almost forty years
of adoption data from Denmark. Short-run child penalties are
slightly larger for biological mothers than for adoptive mothers,
but their long-run child penalties are virtually identical and pre-
cisely estimated. This suggests that biology is not a key driver of
child-related gender gaps.
JEL: D13, J13, J16, J22.
Parenthood has large and persistent effects on the labor market outcomes of women,
but not men. This holds across different households, across different countries and over
time, making it one of the most robust findings in labor economics. Estimates of long-run
child penalties in female earnings range from 20-25% in Scandinavian countries to 30%
in the United States and a staggering 60% in Germany (Kleven, Landais and Søgaard
2019a; Kleven et al. 2019b). In fact, most of the remaining gender inequality in high-
income countries can be attributed to the unequal impacts of children on men and women
(Kleven, Landais and Søgaard 2019a; Kleven et al. 2020).
Why are child penalties so large and persistent? While the evidence on reduced-form
impacts is fairly conclusive, our understanding of the underlying mechanisms is much less
developed. A traditional explanation focuses on the factor that make men and women
obviously different: biology. Only women can bear and give birth to children, and only
women have the option to breastfeed. One would certainly expect such factors to matter
for the short-run impacts of children, say within a year or two of child birth, but they could
also matter for the long-run impacts.
Two sets of reasons point to the possibility of long-run impacts. First, the physiological
implications of pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding may extend beyond the short run.
This could be due either to post-partum health complications or to changes in hormonal
levels and brain structure around child birth. Indeed, a large literature in neurobiology
argues that pregnancy and child birth create lasting changes in hormones and gray matter
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associated with maternal attachment (see e.g., Numan and Insel 2003; Feldman et al. 2007;
Hoekzema et al. 2017). Second, biology may affect long-run labor market outcomes through
the dynamic effects of work interruptions. Interrupting work around pregnancy and infant
child care may affect future earnings capacity through experience effects (such as human
capital accumulation or signaling), and it may change preferences over family vs career.
Indeed, the push for earmarked paternity leave in several countries is predicated on the
idea that such leave may strengthen the bond between father and child, with longer-run
implications for the division of child care.
Testing for the importance of biology requires separating the effects of having a child from
the effects of giving birth to a child. A natural way of obtaining this separation is to compare
child penalties in biological and adoptive families. However, any such investigation faces
two challenges. The first challenge is statistical power: The best estimates of child penalties
are based on event studies around the arrival of children, which require large panel data
sets with information on labor market outcomes and children. This requirement is harder
to satisfy for adopted children, because relatively few families adopt and data sources often
do not record adoptions. We deal with this challenge by using Danish administrative data
that contain exhaustive information on adoptions over almost forty years. The second
challenge is identification: Adoptive families are a selected subsample of the population,
implying that any differences in child penalties between biological and adoptive mothers
may reflect selection rather than biology. We deal with this challenge by matching on a
rich set of observables, showing that the matched samples display parallel pre-trends in the
event studies.
We find large and persistent effects of children on gender gaps in both biological and
adoptive families. Women and men evolve in parallel until the arrival of their first child,
whether by birth or by adoption, and then diverge sharply and persistently. The short-run
impacts are slightly larger in biological families, but the long-run impacts are virtually
identical. Ten years after birth, the child penalty in earnings is 17-18% in both biological
and adoptive families.1 When investigating the underlying determinants of earnings —
participation, hours worked, and wage rates — we find that biological and adoptive families
are similarly impacted in those dimensions too. These findings provide evidence against
the importance of the biological link between mother and child for explaining the gendered
impacts of children.
More broadly, our results have implications for understanding the impact of comparative
advantage in child care on gender gaps. Pregnancy and breastfeeding are the most obvious
sources of such comparative advantage, and if these factors have no impact on long-run
child penalties, it is conceivable that other sources of comparative advantage have no impact
on child penalties either.2 To further investigate the role of comparative advantage, we
1The long-run child penalties estimated here are slightly smaller than those estimated in Kleven, Landais and
Søgaard (2019a) for the full population. This is because we are reweighting biological families to match the char-
acteristics of adoptive families, where the latter tend to have fewer children overall and therefore smaller child
penalties.
2Women may have other biological sources of comparative advantage in child care than pregnancy and breast-
feeding. This includes the argument among some biologists and psychologists that the female brain is hard-wired
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study heterogeneity in child penalties by the earnings potential of mothers relative to
fathers in biological and adoptive families. The earnings potential is estimated based on
detailed information about education level, education field, and labor market experience
at the time of birth of the first child. Strikingly, we find that long-run child penalties are
virtually unaffected by the relative earnings potential of women and men, and this holds
in both biological and adoptive families. These findings suggest against the comparative
advantage channel, and they are consistent with finding a zero effect of biological links
between mother and child.
Our paper contributes to a large literature on gender inequality in the labor market
(recently reviewed by Bertrand 2011 and Olivetti and Petrongolo 2016) and specifically
to studies investigating the importance of parenthood (e.g., Bertrand, Goldin and Katz
2010; Angelov, Johansson and Lindahl 2016; Kleven and Landais 2017; Kleven, Landais
and Søgaard 2019a; Kleven et al. 2019b; Kuziemko et al. 2018). Moreover, our finding
that biological and adoptive mothers experience the same long-run child penalties — even
though adoptees arrive later and require less maternity leave — sheds light on a key finding
in the literature on parental leave policies (reviewed by Olivetti and Petrongolo 2017). This
literature finds that paid leave has no long-term impact on female labor market outcomes
and gender gaps (e.g., Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; Rossin-Slater, Ruhm and Waldfogel
2013; Lalive et al. 2014; Schönberg and Ludsteck 2014; Dahl et al. 2016). Our paper is
consistent with this finding and go one step further: It suggests that we should expect
limited long-term effects on maternal labor market outcomes from any policy or treatment
that affects new mothers only temporarily, say in the first year or two following child birth.
Finally, our paper is related to Andresen and Nix (2019) who study child penalties in
lesbian couples, where one partner is biologically linked to the child while the other partner
is not.3 They find no long-term differences in child penalties between the biological mother
and the ”co-mother”. In other words, biological links do not matter in couples where
gender is held constant. An important advantage of studying adoptive couples over same-
sex couples is that it gives a much larger and less selected sample of the population, yielding
more precision and greater generalizability.4
predominantly for empathy (conducive to care taking) while the male brain is hard-wired predominantly for under-
standing and building systems (see e.g., Baron-Cohen 2005).
3Related, Rosenbaum (2019) studies child penalties in lesbian couples who adopt.
4Regarding the selection argument, an important way in which same-sex parents differ from heterosexual parents
is that their child penalty (for the biological mother as well as the co-mother) converges to zero in the long run. This
stands in sharp contrast to the large long-run child penalties observed for heterosexual parents, whether biological
or adoptive.
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I. Empirical Specification and Data
A. Event Study Specification
We estimate the impact of biological and adopted children on the labor market outcomes
of men and women using the event study approach of Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019a).
Specifically, we consider a balanced panel of parents observed in each year from 5 years
before the arrival of their first child, by birth or by adoption, until 10 years after. We
consider the following specification
(1) Yit = α
′DEventit + β
′DAgeit + γ
′DY earit + νit,
where Yit is the outcome (e.g., earnings) of individual i at event time t. On the right-
hand side, we use boldface to denote vectors. The first term includes event time dummies,
indexed such that t = 0 denotes the year of arrival of the first child. We omit the dummy
for t = −1, so that each αt ∈ α measures the impact of children in a given year relative
to the year before child arrival. The second and third terms include a full set of age
and year dummies to control non-parametrically for lifecycle trends and time trends.5
This specification is run separately for men and women, and for those with biological and
adopted children.
Equation (1) is specified in levels rather than logs to keep observations with zero earnings
and thus capture both intensive and extensive margin responses. We convert level effects
into percentage effects by calculating
(2) Pt ≡
α̂t
E
[
Ỹit | t
] ,
where Ỹit is the predicted outcome when omitting the contribution of the event dummies.
By running the estimations separately for men and women with biological and adopted
children, we obtain four series of Pt. These series can be compared to estimate the impact
of children on women relative to men — child penalties — in biological vs adoptive families
across event time. This will shed light on the potential role of biology for short-run and
long-run child penalties.
It is worth discussing two points on interpretation. First, differences in child penalties
between biological and adoptive parents may not necessarily reflect biology alone, but also
the differential selection of the two sets of parents. As we show, adoptive families tend
to have their first child later, have fewer children overall, and have higher education and
earnings levels. We deal with such selection issues by reweighting the sample of biological
parents to ensure that their distribution of background characteristics (xB) exactly matches
the distribution for the adoptive parents (xA). Formally, we compute weights as the relative
5The conditions for causal identification of the short- and long-term impacts of children in this framework are
laid out and validated in Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019a).
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fraction of individuals with a certain set of characteristics in the two samples (f(xA)/f(xB))
and use these weights in the regression (1) and in the expectation in equation (2) for the
biological sample. By reweighting only the biological sample, we are able to adjust for a
potentially rich set of observables while losing power only in the power-abundant biological
sample.
Our baseline specification reweights the biological sample to match the distribution of
the adoptive sample on the following variables: (i) year of arrival of the first child, (ii) years
to arrival of the second child, (iii) the total number of children, (iv) the mother’s age at
first child, (v) the mother’s pre-child education, and (vi) the mother’s pre-child earnings.
The first three variables (related to the timing and total number of children) ensures that
biological and adoptive families experience the same treatment intensity. This is potentially
important because, even though the event studies are centered on the arrival of the first
child, the longer-run impacts will capture the impact of subsequent children as well. Hence,
finding that biological and adoptive families experience similar long-run child penalties
would not be very informative if they were treated differently by subsequent children.
In robustness checks discussed below, we consider the implications of more parsimonious
weighting schemes.6
Second, since adopted children do not arrive immediately after birth, there is a difference
between event studies centered on child arrivals and event studies centered on child births.
Our baseline specification is based on arrivals — the actual “event” for adoptive families
— but a specification based on births would have merit as well. In particular, centering on
births ensures that biological and adopted children have the same age at each event time,
while centering on arrivals implies that adoptees are a little older (about one year older
on average) at each event time. We consider specifications based on births in the online
appendix, showing that the long-run child penalties are virtually the same when doing this.
B. Data
Our analysis uses administrative data from Statistics Denmark (DST) covering the full
population between 1980 and 2017 (Statistics Denmark 2019a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h). The DST data
combine several administrative registers linked at the individual level through personal
identification numbers. The data allow us to link individuals to their family members and
contain detailed information on earnings, labor supply, education, children, and a range of
other variables.
We focus on the impact of foreign adoptions throughout. Domestic adoptions are less
common, the children tend to be older at arrival, and the adoptive parents often have a pre-
existing link to the child (such as a step parent or aunt/uncle). Importantly, the adoption
registry of Statistics Denmark only covers the period 1988-2009. Using this data alone
would narrow the time window available for our event studies and reduce statistical power.
6Matching on variables determined after the arrival of the first child (years to second child and the total number
of children) may pose threats to identification if these variables respond endogenously to the labor market impacts
of the first child. We therefore consider specifications that match only on pre-child outcomes, showing that the
estimates are very similar.
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We therefore augment the official records by identifying foreign adoptions outside the 1988-
2009 window using information on country of origin and migration history. Specifically, we
define foreign adoptees as individuals who fulfill the following conditions: (1) They were
born in a non-western country, (2) they have two known parents born in a western country,
(3) both parents had their legal address in Denmark (with no emigration record) at the
time the child was born, and (4) the child has a recorded entry (immigration record) into
the Danish Central Person Register after the date of birth.
To validate this procedure, Figure A.I in the online appendix compares our measure of
adoptions to the official records during the time period where we have both. The figure
shows that our measure captures the official numbers almost perfectly. Virtually all of our
adoptees are also listed in the official records (no type II errors) and virtually no adoptees
in the official records are missed by our measure (no type I errors). We find around 400-600
adoptions per year, corresponding to 16,260 children between 1980-2017. About two-thirds
of all foreign adoptees come from Asia, and about 40% of the Asian adoptees come from
South Korea.7
We focus on parents whose first child arrives (by birth or by adoption) between 1985 and
2007, which gives us data for at least 5 years before and 10 years after parenthood in all
families. We require that both parents are known, alive and reside in Denmark in each year
of the event time window (t = −5, ...,+10). We impose no restrictions on the relationship
status of the parents, including parents who are married, cohabiting, separated, divorced,
or have not yet formed a couple in a given year. We also require that all subsequent children
are of the same type as the first (adopted or biological) such that we are comparing purely
biological to purely adoptive families, and we restrict attention to adoptive children arriving
before the age of 5. These data restrictions leave us with around 527,000 first births in the
biological sample and around 4,600 first arrivals in the adoptive sample.8
Our main outcome of interest is annual earnings. This includes income from wages,
salaries, and self-employment. We also consider the impact of children on labor force
participation, hours worked, and wage rates (earnings/hours worked). Our measures of
hours worked and wage rates are based on administrative and third-party reported data
from a mandated pension scheme called Arbejdsmarkedets Tillægspension (ATP), which
requires employers to contribute on behalf of their employees based on individual hours
worked.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics in three samples: adoptive families, biological
families, and reweighted biological families. While other studies (e.g., Fagereng, Mogstad
and Rønning 2019) have shown that foreign adoptees are as good as randomly allocated
to adoptive families, our table shows that adoptive families are a selected subsample of
the population. For example, adoptive parents tend to have their first child later, have
fewer children in total, and have higher education and earnings than biological parents.
This motivates our reweighting procedure described above. As shown in the table, this
procedure ensures that the distribution of adoptive and biological families are balanced
7See Table A.I in the online appendix.
8See Table A.II in the online appendix.
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on year of first child, years to second child, total number of children, the mother’s age
at first child, and the mother’s pre-child education and earnings levels. The adoptive and
reweighted biological samples retain minor discrepancies on some of the matching variables,
because we match on binned rather than continuous variables.
II. Results
A. Child Penalties in Biological vs Adoptive Families
Figure 1 shows the earnings impacts of parenthood on men and women in biological
and adoptive families, respectively. Panel A considers all adoptees pooled, while Panel B
considers adoptees split by their age at arrival. Each dot gives the percentage impact at
event time t (relative to event time -1) based on the specification in (1)-(2). As described
above, this specification controls non-parametrically for any underlying lifecycle and time
trends, and it is implemented on a reweighted biological sample.
Consider first biological families. Relative to the underlying life-cycle and time trends,
the earnings of men and women evolve in parallel until child birth and then diverge sharply.
Female earnings drop by about 25% immediately after child birth, while male earnings are
unaffected. Women recover some of their earnings loss after infant child care, but they never
catch back up to men. The figure shows the implied long-run child penalty, defined as the
average difference in the impact of children (Pt in equation 2) between men and women
across event times 6-10. The long-run child penalty in biological families is equal to 17.0%.
These findings are well-known and hold across different countries (Kleven, Landais and
Søgaard 2019a; Kleven et al. 2019b).9
Consider then adoptive families. The main insight from Panel A of Figure 1 is that
adoptive families are affected by parenthood in much the same way as biological families.
The earnings of adoptive parents evolve in parallel before having children and then diverge
sharply and persistently after having children. The short-run earnings impacts are some-
what smaller in adoptive families than in biological families, but the long-run impacts are
virtually the same. The long-run child penalty on adoptive mothers equals 18.1% and is sta-
tistically indistinguishable from the penalty of 17.0% on biological mothers. That is, even
though adoptive mothers are not biologically linked to their children and are unaffected
by aspects such as breastfeeding and postpartum health complications, they converge to
long-run penalties at least as large as those for biological mothers.
Furthermore, the penalties on adoptive mothers feature little heterogeneity by their
child’s age at arrival as shown in Panel B. The different adoptive subsamples — those with
early, intermediate, and late arrivals — line up closely throughout the event study window.
Even adoptive mothers whose first child arrives after the age of one (two) experience a long-
run penalty of 17.9% (16.7%), statistically indistinguishable from the penalty of 17.0% on
9The long-run child penalty of 17.0% estimated here is slightly smaller than the penalty of 19.4% estimated in
Kleven, Landais and Søgaard (2019a). This is due to the fact that biological families have been reweighted to match
adoptive families.
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biological mothers. In other words, the age of the child is not critical for the labor market
impacts, at least not after the initial stage of breastfeeding and infant child care.10
As discussed in Section I, our baseline specification reweights the biological sample to
match the adoptive sample in terms of the number and timing of children as well as
the mother’s education and earnings levels prior to having children. Figure A.III in the
online appendix investigates robustness to alternative weighting schemes. Without any
reweighting (Panel A), the long-run child penalty is 3.4pp larger in biological families than
in adoptive families. Matching the samples on some observables is therefore important for
the conclusion that biology does not affect long-run penalties. Reweighting only on pre-
birth variables (Panel B) avoids any concerns about the potential endogeneity of fertility
decisions made after the first child. Reassuringly, this specification yields very similar
results as the baseline specification (repeated in Panel C of the figure).11
B. Anatomy of Child Penalties
In this section we investigate the anatomy of the large and persistent earnings impacts
of both biological and adopted children. Figure 2 presents event studies of the three
underlying earnings determinants: hours worked conditional on working (Panel A), the
labor force participation rate (Panel B), and the wage rate (Panel C).
For hours worked and the wage rate, we find virtually identical child penalties in biological
and adoptive families throughout the event study window. The long-run hours penalty is
about 7% and the wage rate penalty is about 10% in both family types. The participation
penalty, on the other hand, is larger in biological families than in adoptive families during
the initial years of parenthood. But the two family types converge to the same level over
time, a long-run participation penalty of around 3-4%. Taken together, these findings imply
that the short-lived differences in earnings penalties documented in the previous section can
be explained by differences in extensive margin responses that last for 3-4 years and then
dissipate. The short-run differences in extensive margin responses are likely driven by the
larger need for maternity leave among biological mothers due to aspects like breastfeeding
and health complications.
Table 2 summarizes the graphical results presented so far. The table shows estimates of
child penalties in different labor market outcomes (earnings, hours, participation, and wage
rates) in biological and adoptive families. Panel A focuses on the short run (event times
0-5), while Panel B focuses on the long run (event times 6-10). The short-run earnings
penalty is 3.7 percentage points larger in biological families than in adoptive families and
10In Figure A.II in the online appendix, we replicate the analysis presented here when centering on child births
instead of child arrivals. In this case, the short-run differences between biological and adoptive families are larger
due to the delayed arrival of adoptees. When splitting adoptees by their age at arrival, the short-run impacts are
staggered across ages as one would expect. Despite these short-run differences, however, the long-run impacts on
biological and adoptive families are still very similar (and they are similar to those estimated when centering the
analysis on arrivals in Figure 1).
11All of the matching variables that we retain in the more parsimonious specification in Panel B (year of first
child, mother’s age at first child, and mother’s pre-child education and earnings) do matter for our conclusions. For
example, if we do not match on pre-child education and earnings, the short-run differences between biological and
adoptive mothers become larger and there are some long-run differences as well.
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this difference is statistically significant. Looking at the underlying drivers of the difference
in earnings impacts, only the difference in participation impacts is statistically significant.
Turning to the long run, the differences in child penalties between biological and adoptive
mothers are small and statistically insignificant for all four outcomes. The differences are
precisely estimated, allowing us to rule out any economically significant impact of biology
on observed child penalties.
C. Heterogeneity in Child Penalties by Comparative Advantage
A classic explanation for the large and persistent child penalties on women focuses on
specialization based on comparative advantage: women have a comparative advantage in
child care, while men have a comparative advantage in market work. Our results have
implications for this interpretation. The most obvious reason why women would have a
comparative advantage in child care is based on the biological link between mother and
child. The fact that only women can bear children and breastfeed almost certainly gives
them a comparative advantage in the early stages of parenthood, and it may give rise to
longer-lasting comparative advantage due to changes in earnings capacity and preferences.
The absence of persistent differences in child penalties between biological and adoptive
mothers run counter to these ideas. However, it is possible that comparative advantage is
important, but that the source of comparative advantage studied here (the biological link
between mother and child) is short-lived, while other sources of comparative advantage are
longer-lived. To investigate this point, this section presents evidence on heterogeneity in
child penalties by comparative advantage.
Studying the role of comparative advantage requires a measure of male and female earn-
ings capacity within families. To avoid endogeneity of measured earnings capacity to
children, one strategy would be to divide the sample by observed earnings prior to the
arrival of children. However, selecting subsamples based on pre-child earnings may create
problems with mean reversion: If earnings consist of both permanent and transitory income
components, we would be splitting the sample partly by transitory income shocks rather
than by comparative advantage alone. To avoid such problems, we use potential earnings
rather than actual earnings to measure comparative advantage.
We estimate potential earnings based on Mincer regressions of earnings on education
level and experience within cells of education field. Dividing the sample into 140 different
education fields (such as “physics” or “acting”), we run the following regression within
each field
(3) lnYis = αEduis + β1Expis + β2Exp
2
is + γY ears + νis,
where Yis is earnings of individual i in year s, Eduis is a set of education dummies (six
levels from elementary school to PhD), Expis is experience (years since graduation), and
Y ears is a set of year dummies. These regressions are run on the sample of men alone
(as they are unaffected by children), using the estimated coefficients to predict potential
earnings for both men and women. We then split the sample by relative female earnings
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potential within families prior to the arrival of the first child (at event time -1).
The results are shown in Figure 3. The figure shows earnings impacts in both biological
and adoptive families, split by relative female earnings potential. Panel A compares families
below and above the median of the distribution of relative female earnings potential, while
Panel B compares families in the bottom and top quartiles of that distribution. The
difference in comparative advantage is sizeable in these sample cuts: Women in the top
quartile (half) of relative female earnings potential contribute 61% (57%) of the total
household earnings potential, whereas women in the bottom quartile (half) contribute
only 38% (42%). If comparative advantage matters, we should see larger child penalties
in families where the woman’s relative earnings potential is lower. Instead we see that
child penalties are unrelated to our proxy for comparative advantage: the long-run child
penalties are very similar for low-earning and high-earning mothers, and this holds in both
biological and adoptive families.12 This suggests against the importance of the comparative
advantage channel and is consistent with our main finding that biology has no effect on
child penalties.
III. Conclusion
A recent literature documents large child penalties in female labor market outcomes,
showing that these penalties can explain most of the remaining gender inequality in devel-
oped countries (see e.g., Kleven, Landais and Søgaard 2019a; Kleven et al. 2019b). In this
paper, we ask why the impacts of children are so large and gendered, focusing on traditional
explanations rooted in biology and comparative advantage. Using Danish administrative
data, we provide compelling event study evidence on child penalties in biological and adop-
tive families. Despite the existence of short-run differences in the child penalties of these
two family types, they converge to the same penalty in the long run. This is true for
earnings as well as for its underlying determinants.
Our findings provide evidence against the importance of biological links between mother
and child for explaining child penalties. Moreover, since these biological links represent
some of the most obvious sources of comparative advantage, they provide evidence against
classic specialization stories. We provide further evidence on comparative advantage, show-
ing that child penalties are unrelated to the relative earnings potential within families in
both biological and adoptive families. Overall, this paper suggests that child-related gender
inequality (i.e., most remaining gender inequality) cannot be understood through the lens
of biology and incentive-based specialization, pushing towards a greater focus on preference
formation, social norms and culture.
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Lalive, Rafael, Anaĺıa Schlosser, Andreas Steinhauer, and Josef Zweimüller.
2014. “Parental Leave and Mothers’ Careers: The Relative Importance of Job Protection
and Cash Benefits.” The Review of Economic Studies, 81: 219–265.
Lalive, Rafael, and Josef Zweimüller. 2009. “How Does Parental Leave Affect Fertility
and Return to Work? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 124(3): 1363–1402.
Numan, Michael, and Thomas R. Insel. 2003. The Neurobiology of Parental Behavior.
Springer-Verlag New York.
Olivetti, Claudia, and Barbara Petrongolo. 2016. “The Evolution of Gender Gaps in
Industrialized Countries.” Annual Review of Economics, 8: 405–434.
Olivetti, Claudia, and Barbara Petrongolo. 2017. “The Economic Consequences of
Family Policies: Lessons from a Century of Legislation in High-Income Countries.” Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1): 205–230.
Rosenbaum, Philip. 2019. “The Family Earnings Gap Revisited: A Household or a
Labor Market Problem?” Working Paper.
Rossin-Slater, Maya, Christopher J. Ruhm, and Jane Waldfogel. 2013. “The
Effects of California’s Paid Family Leave Program on Mothers’ Leave-Taking and
Subsequent Labor Market Outcomes.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
32(2): 224–245.
Schönberg, Uta, and Johannes Ludsteck. 2014. “Expansions in Maternity Leave
Coverage and Mothers’ Labor Market Outcomes after Childbirth.” Journal of Labor
Economics, 32(3): 469–505.
Statistics Denmark. 2019a. “Adoptioner (ADOP, Adoptions), 1980-2017 [database].”
Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019b. “Befolkningen (BEF, Population), 1980-2017 [database].”
Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019c. “Husstande og familier (FAIN, Households and Families),
1980-2017 [database].” Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019d. “IDAP Arbejdsmarkedsdata (IDAP, Labor Market Data),
1980-2017 [database].” Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019e. “Indkomst (IND, Income), 1980-2017 [database].” Research
Service of Statistics Denmark.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE DOES BIOLOGY DRIVE CHILD PENALTIES? 13
Statistics Denmark. 2019f. “RAS Arbejdsmarkedsdata (RAS, Labor Market Data),
1980-2017 [database].” Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019g. “Uddanelser (UDDA, Educations), 1980-2017 [database].”
Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark. 2019h. “Vandringer (VNDS, Migrations), 1980-2017 [database].”
Research Service of Statistics Denmark.
14 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
Figure 1. : Child Penalties in Biological vs Adoptive Families
A: All Adoptees
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B: Adoptees by Age at Arrival
Arrival of
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 Long-Run Child Penalty:
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Note: The figure shows the impact of children (Pt defined in equation 2) on the earnings of men and women in
biological and adoptive families, respectively. The sample of biological parents is reweighted to match the distribution
of the adoptive parents on (i) year of first child, (ii) years to second child, (iii) total number of children, (iv) mother’s
age at first child, (v) mother’s pre-child education, and (vi) mother’s pre-child earnings. Panel A pools all adoptees,
while Panel B splits adoptees by their age at arrival. The long-run child penalty is defined as the average difference
in the impact of children between men and women across event times 6-10. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500
replications).
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Figure 2. : Anatomy of Child Penalties
A: Hours Worked
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B: Participation Rate
Arrival of
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 Long-Run Child Penalty:
Biological: -0.034 (0.008)
Adoptive: -0.042 (0.012)
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C: Wage Rate
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Note: The figure shows the impact of children (Pt defined in equation 2) on the underlying determinants of earnings
for men and women in biological and adoptive families, respectively. Panel A shows the impact on hours worked
(conditional on working) using our ATP hours measure. Panel B shows the impact on participation (positive ATP
hours). Panel C shows the impact on the wage rate (conditional on working), computed as annual earnings divided
by annual ATP hours. We winsorize wage rates at 0 and the 99th percentile to deal with measurement error due to
the fact that some workers (in particular, the self-employed) may have large positive or negative earnings with very
small ATP hours. The figure is otherwise constructed as Panel A of Figure 1 and the sample of biological parents is
reweighted in the same way. Standard errors are bootstrapped (500 replications).
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Figure 3. : Child Penalties by Relative Female Earnings Potential
A: Bottom Half vs Top Half
Arrival of
First Child
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Note: The figure is constructed in the same way as Figure 1 and shows the earnings impact of children on men and
women in biological and adoptive families, respectively. To investigate the role of comparative advantage, the sample
of women is split by relative female earnings potential within families prior to the arrival of children (at event time
-1). The earnings potential of women and men is estimated based on Mincer regressions of earnings on education
level and experience within cells of education field (as specified in eq. 3). Panel A compares women below and
above the median of the distribution of relative female earnings potential, while Panel B compares women in the
bottom and top quartiles of that distribution. These splits are done separately for biological and adoptive mothers,
but the distributions of relative female earnings potential are very similar for the two samples. Standard errors are
bootstrapped (500 replications).
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Table 2—: Child Penalties in Biological vs Adoptive Families
Earnings Hours Participation Wage Rate
Panel A: Short Run (Event Times 0-5)
Biological −0.190 −0.106 −0.042 −0.067
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Adoptive −0.153 −0.098 −0.028 −0.053
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Difference 0.037 0.007 0.014 0.014
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Panel B: Long Run (Event Times 6-10)
Biological −0.170 −0.065 −0.034 −0.106
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Adoptive −0.181 −0.073 −0.042 −0.105
(0.020) (0.007) (0.012) (0.016)
Difference −0.011 −0.008 −0.008 0.001
(0.022) (0.009) (0.013) (0.018)
Note: The table shows estimates of child penalties in biological and adoptive families for different labor market
outcomes (earnings, hours, participation, and wage rates) . Child penalties are defined as the impact of children for
women relative to men (Pwoment −Pment where Pt is defined in eq. 2). Panel A shows short-run penalties (an average
across event times 0-5), while Panel B shows long-run penalties (an average across event times 6-10). Standard errors
are bootstrapped (500 replications).
